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1. Introduction 
The 1990s have been marked by important transitions in 
the form of operation of the Brazilian energy sector. As with all 
infrastructure sectors, the State has been responsible for invest-
ment in the energy sector, both for strategic and economic 
reasons. Beginning in the 1980s, the end of the model of import 
substitution, the fiscal crisis and the consequent incapacity of 
the State to support the adequate provision of essential infras-
tructure services generated important changes in various sectors 
of the Brazilian economy. Throughout the 1980s, the economy 
experienced what carne to be called the "lost decade", due to 
political impasses and the lack of social consensus on a better 
alternative to overcome the crisis resulting from the economic 
growth model. 
In the 1990s, government initiatives focused on promoting 
a new operational model for the economy. Taking advantage of 
the surge in foreign capital inflows, economic policies removed 
barriers to foreign trade and foreign investment, and, together 
with a very successful price stabilisation plan, initiated the reform 
of the infrastructure sector in a context of international financial 
turbulence and in view of the permanent need to resolve structu-
ral problems such as the fiscal situation. 
The reform of the Brazilian energy sector, as well as that 
of all sectors, includes various objectives, such as reducing the 
national debt, creating competitive structures whenever possible 
and transferring to the private sector the responsibility for inves-
tment to expand production. As a result, the need arises to create 
a new regulatory framework and regulatory agencies (a new 
institutional concept for Brazil) that will come to constitute a 
decentralised control by the State in these sectors. 
In spite of these general orientations, the speed of the 
reform has varied depending on the segment, reflecting, among 
other things, the different strategic evaluations of the role of the 
electricity and oil sectors in the international context and the 
various interest groups that operate in each of these sectors. 
This paper seeks to make a brief comparison of the char-
acteristics of the Brazilian energy and oil sector reforms and at 
the same time discuss the main challenges. The paper is organ-
ised in four sections in addition to this brief introduction. The 
second section presents the characteristics of the regulatory 
agencies, an essential and landmark feature of the new model. 
The third section highlights the main regulatory instruments for 
achieving the objectives defined for the regulatory agenda. The 
outlook is discussed in section four. Finally, section five presents 
the concluding comments. 
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2. Regulatory Agencies for the Energy and Oil Sectors 
2.1. The Importance of Regulatory Agencies 
In view of the new regulatory challenges and in a context 
of scepticism regarding natural monopolies, privatisation and the 
progressive introduction of competition, the configuration of in-
dependent regulatory agencies acquires a decisive role in the 
success of the policies implemented to restructure the infrastruc-
ture sector. 
The term "independence" is used here in its semantic 
meaning, which correlates to "autonomy". The importance of 
these considerations is that, according to the traditional theory 
of the State and the classification of public entities, the only 
entities considered independent are those which, as set forth in 
the Constitution, represent the leveis of government: the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches. In contrast to the indepen-
dence of these branches, which is total, only restricted by the 
control exercised by one branch of government over another, the 
level of independence desired for regulatory agencies is limited to 
the technical and operational autonomy related to the exercise of 
its regulatory duties. 1 Thus, following the determination of the 
oversight, incentive and planning policies by the executive 
branch, and the approval of these by the legislative in accordance 
with the law, the regulatory agency becomes responsible for the 
practical implementation of the rules adopted for its specific area. 
The agency's autonomy in carrying out these duties is charac-
terised by the regulatory responsibilities related to technical 
matters and the discretionary power 2 used (also technical) in its 
decisions. Also, the agency's regulatory agenda must be clearly 
defined so that effective responsibility for results can be estab-
lished. Objectives cannot be excessively vague or ample, and it is 
essential that responsibilities be clearly outlined Majone (1999)]. 
This independence is necessary because, with the in-
creased complexity of industry and the expansion of the private 
1 According to Moreira Neto (1999, p. 82), "independence originating from the normative power of 
regulatory agencies can be classified as a type of normative responsibility granted to the agency, 
referred to by the Administrative Rights doctrine as `delegalization'. In other words, it 'fulfills the 
need of essentially technical legislation with a minimum political-administrative influence from the 
State'." In fact, according to Souto (1999, p. 132), "independence is the result of political support of 
the nomination approved by the legislative power, the fixed-period terms of the directors and the 
natural flow of resources to outlays collected from regulated firms in the tax base." Finally, according 
to Mannheimer (1998), "the basic premise for the existence and acceptance of a regulatory agency 
is its independence." It is important to note that in Brazil's case, regulatory agencies hold legal status 
as autonomous state-owned companies, and can also be characterized as independent (or autono-
mous) government agencies. 
2 The discretionary power of government administration refers to the relative margin of freedom that 
the administrator has to make certain decisions in accordance with the convenience and opportunity 
factors of the measure. However, this flexibility in making decisions is subordinate, as are ali other 
acts of government administration, to the principies established by law. 
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sector, agency's actions must be determined based on the speci-
fics of each sector and insulated against influence from interest 
groups and macroeconomic implications. This generates, among 
other things, two important effects: a reduction in investors' risk, 
who are reluctant to negotiate with the government due to uncer-
tainties inherent in relations with the State, illustrating the 
importance of clear and stable regulations with well-defined mies 
and responsibilities; and, bringing together the basic factors for 
the effective fulfilment of the regulatory objectives for advancing 
economic efficiency and social well being. 
The first basic factor for autonomous decision making 
concerns the criteria for selecting directors, which should be 
based on the asymmetries of pro-producer information and the 
risks of the transfer of decision making power away from the 
agency always present in regulatory activities. This brings, as a 
consequence, social legitimacy to regulatory action. According to 
Majone (1999, p. 19), the administrative demands of regulating 
the public sector are better met by flexible and highly-specialised 
organisations that have considerable autonomy in the decision 
making process in which knowledge, specific experience and a 
positive reputation are the keys to greater efficiency. 
The second basic factor is the guarantee of stability during 
the administrators' mandates (with removal from office only in 
instances provided by law), with nomination procedures submit-
ted to the legislative branch. Protected by the risk of removal from 
their posts without just cause, agency directors are thus immune 
from possible government pressures related to the way in which 
policies that deal with the implementation of the general guide-
lines of the regulatory agenda proceed through the system. 
Further, the fulfilment of the regulatory agenda does not suffer 
any problems of continuity due to changes in administrations. 
The third basic factor is the agency's financial and ad-
ministrative independence - which is only possible if its revenue 
is made up of its own internai budget, generally originating from 
the granting of concessions and fees charged for the oversight of 
the operations of the regulated companies - which thus allows it 
to prepare itself with the personnel and materiais needed for the 
effective implementation of the regulatory agenda. 
The last basic factor is the effective authority of the 
agency's decisions in the mediation and arbitration of any possi-
ble conflicts between consumers, companies and the government 
in its respective sector, without running the risk of issues arising 
among the other branches of government, except in the cases of 
ilegal procedures. 
Further, transparency is fundamental to assure social 
legitimacy of the agency's independent activities. In this sense, 
the autonomous state-owned entity must assure, by means of 
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legislative frameworks and practical mechanisms, the greatest 
number possible of communication channels, with consumers 
and their representative organisations in such a way as to obtain 
a pluralist and balanced picture of interest groups' specific points 
of view. To assist in this task, the agency must make use of the 
practice of consultation of the public, through hearings of the 
public prior to the making of decisions with the publication of 
preliminary documents for the appreciation of those interested. 
A decisive aspect for the improvement of transparency and the 
agency's sense of responsibility is to establish mandatory require-
ments for the formulation by regulators of their limes of thinking 
that goes behind decisions and answers to all of the ideas brought 
forward at the hearings of the public prior to the making of the 
decision. Other desirable aspects of social control are to require 
approval by the legislative branch of annual balance sheets of the 
agency's operations and adoption of auditing procedures to main-
tain social control over the agency. 
And finally, in order to maximise regulatory efficiency, 
co-operation is recommended among the various regulatory agen-
cies, whether sector specific or not, to adopt procedures, ap-
proaches and similar procedural customs, especially in matters 
related to defending competitiveness, antitrust suits and defen-
ding consumers. To this end, it is particularly advantageous that 
the regulatory agency has power in its specific sector to access 
the information needed for investigations of any possible anti-
competitive behaviour and negligente by the concession holders 
in providing quality service. 
2.2. Regulatory Agencies in Brazil: Aneel and ANP 
In Brazil, the creation of various regulatory agencies rep-
resents a watershed event in the Brazilian regulatory tradition, 
in view of the history of tacit regulation of companies in infras-
tructure, whether by the Brazilian Water and Electricity Depart-
ment (Dnaee) or the Brazilian Fuel Department (DNC), which were 
both subordinated to the Mining and Energy Ministry. In this 
traditional configuration, sector-specific policies were directly 
subordinated to the executive branch, which sometimes resulted 
in attempts at achieving contradictory objectives, such as microe-
conomic (efficient production), macroeconomic (control of infla-
tion and fiscal deficits) and social (universal access to services) 
objectives. 
It is important to add that during the period in which the 
majority of companies in industry were state-owned, no effective 
form of social regulation was exercised. The reason for this is the 
inherent disinterest of the State in self-oversight, in view of the 
fact that it held a majority stake in the companies and there were 
no social mechanisms for the control of there companies. Exam-
ples in this light are the critical environmental problems that 
Ensaios BNDES n 9 11 	 6 
appeared over the course of projects in the 1980s and the lack of 
mechanisms through which consumers could direct their com-
plaints of abuses of their rights. Moreover, the Consumer Protec-
tion Code was only set finto law in 1990. 
Thus, the creation of agencies strengthened the appear-
ance of new players in the sectorial decision-making arena, 
especially with the greater balance among the powers of each 
government branch. 3 What in the past routinely became a series 
of internai bureaucratic conflicts now became externalised, with 
the legal process being directed to the appropriate forums, pref-
erably in the quasi-judicial cases of the agencies. The creation of 
independent agencies becomes particularly important in view of 
the Brazilian political tradition, which, due to the weakness of 
nation-wide projects, creates excessive instability in response to 
shifts in power, with solutions constantly being needed to provide 
continuation to government policies. Since the support of govern-
ment administrations frequently involves ad hoc alliances, the 
legislative branch cannot compel future legislators to make any 
decisions, and, similarly, an administration cannot comprise the 
administrations that come to follow, government policies, espe-
cially sector-specific policies, always are vulnerable and of a lower 
priority and, as a consequente, have low credibility. 
In Brazil, the National Electricity Agency (Aneel) was cre-
ated by Law 9,427 on December 26, 1996 and Law 9,478 created 
the National Oil Agency (ANP) on August 6, 1997. 
The constitution in respect to this new form of organisation 
of the State is not a simple or consensual issue 4 and continues 
to cause controversy, especially in the states that generally have 
not prepared themselves to regulate public services. Public utility 
sectors, as notes Pinheiro (1999, p. 172), are responsible for 
one-third of privatisation proceeds (US$ 23.7 billion from the sale 
of 30 companies). In this light the Supreme Court (STF) made an 
important ruling that strengthened the independence of regula-
tory agencies. The STF ruled partially in favour of the unconsti-
tutionality suit brought by Rio Grande do Sul state government 
related to the state laws that set forth that the appointment and 
removal of the members of the board must be submitted to the 
legislature. The STF understood that the removal from office of 
the board members could be carried out by the chief of the 
executive branch as long as it was brought forward and followed 
3 Majone (1999) highlights two distinct views of democracy, the "majority" or "populist" model and the 
"State regulator" model. In the former, democracy is viewed as the government of the majority, with 
this group necessarily controlling the entire govemment to assure that all areas of govemment are 
controlled by the majority. The latter model, represented by the State regulator, is characterized by 
pluralism, the distribution of control and extensive delegation of tasks to institutions outside of the 
majority, such as independent organizations or commissions. 
4 In the electricity sector, the approval of the bill to create Aneel was extremely controversial and 
changes to the text of the administration's bill by Congress avoided that the approved bill was 
significantly short of the strength needed for the agency to function as an independent entity 
[Abranches (1999)]. 
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Autonomous decision 	Special autonomous state-owned 
making, finance and company; 
administration 	 Regulatory responsibilities of 
sector-specific technical issues by means 
of resolutions and ministerial orders; 
Arbitration power; 
Internai funding. 
Stability 	 Fixed-period terms; 
Rigid criteria for removal of directors. 
Transparency 	 Nonconcurrent terms; 
Hearings of the public; 
Appointments approved by legislative 
branch; 
Rigid criteria for removal of directors; 
Ombudsman; 
Management contracts. 
Specialisation 	 Specialised technical personnel. 
Institutional co-operation 
to defend competition and SDE.b 
consumers 
Special autonomous state-owned 
company; 
Regulatory responsibilities of 
sector-specific technical issues by means 





Hearings of the public; 
Appointments approved by legislative 
branch; 
Electronic recordings and public 
deliberations. 




by administrative or judicial process, which guaranteed a truthful 
version of the situation and an adequate defence. 5 The acceptance 
of this new form of action by the State is expected to be progressive 
and depend basically on the efficiency of the actions taken by the 
agencies currently in place. However, in a virtuous circle the 
likelihood of this outcome is directly related to the existence of 
previously discussed prerequisites. 
In general, these prerequisites are included in the by-laws 
of Aneel and ANP (Table 1). In fact, the two agencies were 
established as autonomous state-owned companies and their 
revenues are expected basically to comprise internai funding that 
comes from its oversight activities, which assures them autono-
mous decision making and administration. 
However, there are important differences between the two 
agencies that could come to have a significant impact on the 
efficiency and autonomy of the agencies' actions. The presidential 
veto of the clause in the law that created the ANP which set forth 
strict criteria for removal from office negatively impacted the 
stability and the transparency of regulatory agencies, leaving 
them vulnerable to the decision making of the executive branch 
and facilitating the capture of these agencies by others interest 
groups. The ANP also does not have an ombudsman, although 
the use of electronic recordings of the deliberative sessions of the 
agency's directors is expected. 
Table 1 






Source: Adapted from Pires (1999) and Pires and Piccinini (1999). 
aFor the distribution of piped gas. 
b  Economic Rights Secretariat (SDE), connected with the Justice Ministry. 
cEconomic Defence Council (Carie), connected with the Justice Ministry. 
5 The objective of the Rio Grande do Sul state government was to remove the board members appointed 
by the previous administration [Gazeta Mercantil (November 19, 1999)]. 
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Another important aspect is that, both in the case of the 
ANP and Aneel, no consulting councils with representatives from 
various interest groups with involvement in regulatory decision 
making were instituted, which reduces the transparency and the 
efficiency in the checks and balances of the agencies. Similarly, 
the legislation that created the two agencies provided for succes-
sive terms for directors, making the agency's board of directors 
more sensitive to the risks of the transfer of decision-making 
activities away from the agency due to the repeated negotiation 
and arbitration interactions with the parties involved in regula-
tory activities. 6 
Finally, in both agencies clear objectives were established 
for the regulatory agenda, and in Aneel's case there is still a 
management contract that specifies regulatory targets and that 
must be adhered by the administrative council. Two other factors 
deserve mention. The first is that both Aneel and ANP were given 
the right to carry out the tender offer of concessions. The second 
is that Law 9,478 of 1997 that defines the ANP's agenda sets forth 
that the agency must follow any rulings made by the National 
Energy Policy Council (CNPE), although this has not been put into 
practice. 7 
However, there are challenges to be overcome for the 
agency's regulatory agenda to be put into effect efficiently, espe-
cially those brought about by the lack of a regulatory tradition 
and the lack of specialised personnel not yet hired by the former 
state-owned companies or government organs. 8 Other obstacles 
are the prevent problems that prevent the effective authority of 
Aneel's decisions in the resolution of any possible conflicts. Even 
though Law 8,987 of 1995 (the Concessions Law) provides for the 
agency's adoption of arbitration, the situation is not absent from 
turmoil, in view of the fact that Law 9,307 of 1996 (the Arbitration 
Law) applies to commercial contracts, while administrative agree-
ments fall outside of its scope. Viewpoints on the issue are 
divergent and possible arbitration carried out by the agency could 
be transferred to the jurisdiction of the judicial branch. 9 In 
practice, this possibility leads many of the agency's decisions to 
not have the expected immediate effects due to the inherent 
sluggishness of the judicial system. Finally, it would be advanta-
geous to refine the legal system so that a possible removal from 
6 For more information on Brazilian regulatory agencies, see Pires and Piccinini (1999). 
7 This factor was highlighted by Leite (1999, p. 418). 
8 In the initial phases of the reform of the infrastructure sector there was an ambiguous relationship 
between specialization of the directors and the transfer of decision-making activities away from the 
agency. Specialization brings credibility and a positive reputation to the regulatory agency, also 
helping to reduce the asymmetry of information. However, in a context of transition the majority of 
personnel are located in sector-specific companies or organs, which possibly contributes to the 
transfer of decision-making activities away from the agency or the reproduction of cultures with a 
greater focus on engineering (technical regulations) than the economy (economic regulation). This 
aspect is highlighted by Pinheiro (1999). 
9 For further information on the issue, see Souto (1999). Also see Pinheiro (1999), who suggests that 
the same worth should be given to collective decisions by regulatory agencies and to decisions made 
by judges in the lower courts, so that pleas to the courts will be guided directly to the higher courts. 
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office of the directors by a unilateral mandate by the chief 
executive would also be submitted to the legislative branch with 
a view to creating an additional safeguard against the political 
use of the agency's various offices. 
In addition, there was a lag time between the implementa-
tion of the reforms (covered in detail further ahead) and the 
creation of the agencies, which, in Aneel's case, helps to weaken, 
although temporarily, its legitimacy in conducting regulatory 
activities. In the electricity sector, the creation of Aneel was 
preceded by the beginning of privatisation, which yielded a series 
of implications for the new model, which will be addressed in the 
next section. 
3. The New Model and Regulatory Instrumentsw 
3.1. Promoting Entry 
The institutional structure and the regulatory model 
adopted in the electrical and oil sectors differ significantly from 
each other, both with regard to the speed of implementation, and 
to the objectives of the reforms in question. The progressive loss 
on the part of the State's capacity for investing in infrastructure, 
with the consequent compromising of quality and the expansion 
and modernisation of public services led to the approval of the 
Law of Concessions, a regulatory standard for private sector entry 
to, exit from and operation within infrastructure sectors. 
The guiding idea in the electricity sector was that the 
variables that determined the functioning of the segment would 
be independent of any exogenous factors, with the establishment 
of conditions for full scale privatisation and the introduction of 
competition on international lines. According to the prevailing 
view, the electrical sector offered the best opportunities for raising 
funds for the reduction of the public-sector deficit, as well as for 
introducing competition finto the generation and sale segments, 
in the light of the variety of existing agents. 
While the federal government never expressed its view of 
the oil sector explicitly, it regarded oil as an important commodity; 
the price and supply of which depended on factors beyond its 
control. Another important point was that the sector was verti-
calized in the prospecting, exploration and transport segments, 
due to the State monopoly enjoyed by Petrobras. For this reason, 
the government adopted a strategy of long-term transition to a 
more competitive model of marginal privatisation, that is, the 
10 This section draws on the paper by Pires and Piccinini (1999), which provides an overview of 
regulation in other Brazilian infrastructure sectors. 
Ensaios BNDES n 2 1 1 	 10 
entry of the private sector through partnerships with Petrobras, 
and competition for new, unexplored areas. 11 In addition, having 
understood the strategic character of the oil sector, the govern-
ment realised that it was important to establish a regulatory 
agency in order to guarantee the adequate supply of this raw 
material. 
In keeping with the principie of consolidating an institu-
tional system that would make feasible both privatisation and the 
entry of private operators into the electrical sector, Aneel sought 
to establish a series of conditions that would encourage the entry 
into the generation and commercial segments, 12 that would 
regulate free access to electrical transmission fines, and that 
would adopt tariff mechanisms in those segments that remained 
natural monopolies (the case of transmission, distribution and 
sale of energy to captive clients), that would give consumers some 
of the efficiency gains achieved by concessionaires. 13 
Aneel took the bet that a competitive generation segment 
would be consolidated through a rapid increase in the use of 
natural gas as a proportion of total national energy consumption, 
due to the construction of gas pipelines that connected Brazil with 
neighbouring exporters such as Bolivia and Argentina, as well as 
the technological alternative of gas-fired combined cycle genera-
tion plants. 14 Minimum requirements were established for the 
sale of electricity for the free negotiation of energy requirements 
between agents. In this way, generators with capacity of 50 MW 
or more, all retailers (distributors and sellers of electricity) with 
loads of 100 GWh or more, and ali large consumers with demand 
of 10 MWh or more will be able to buy and sell energy on the 
recently created Wholesale Electricity Market (MAE). 13 
Various instruments were created in the oil and natural 
gas sector to regulate the entry of new agents following the 
relaxation of Petrobras' monopoly in the areas of exploration, 
development and production of oil and natural gas, oil refining, 
importing and exporting of oil, oil by-products and natural gas, 
including via pipelines. 
11 Rodrigues and Giambiagi (1998) highlight the fact that the government's need for political support 
for ending Petrobras monopoly, as well as its concern to avoid splitting the government coalition led 
it to compromise on keeping the company in the public sector. 
12 The sale of electricity is a new segment that is being created within the sector, composed of brokers 
and retailers, who buy energy from distributors or even generators, for sale to large consumers. 
13 In the transmission and distribution segments, entry occurs through a tender process for the 
granting of concessions. 
14 The legal system of incentives for entry into the generation segment is constituted by Law 9,074 of 
1995, modified by Law 9,427 of 1996 and 9,648 of 1998, which established the conditions for the 
granting of concessions or authorizations for independent producers. Hydroelectric producers must 
obtain authorization for use of generating capacity greater than 1,000 kW and less than 30,000 kW. 
Capacities greater than 30,000 kW will be the object of tenders for concessions to use public goods. 
Thermoelectric generation is also subject to concession (through tenders) or authorization. 
15 The MAE was created by Law 9,648 of 1998 and regulated by Decree 2,655 of 1998, and serves to 
intermediate all electricity purchase and sale transactions for each of the interconnected electricity 
systems. 
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Within the activities of exploration, development and pro-
duction of oil and natural gas entry has become subject to the 
award of a concession, preceded by a tender on the basis of the 
largest amount offered for the concession. The first round of 
tenders has already occurred, representing the entry of several 
global players in the upstream segment of the industry. The first 
round of tender offer of areas for exploration, development and 
production of oil and gas, carried out in June 1999, raised 
US$ 189 milhion, with successful bids by 10 foreign groups from 
five countries (United Kingdom, Netherlands, United States, Italy 
and Argentina) as well as Petrobras (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Results of the Brazil Oil & Gas Round 1 Process: Bid 
Statistics for Individual Companies - June 1999 
Companie Country Blocks Bid Succefull Signature Bonus 
(US$ 'Thousand) 
Petrobras Brazil 5 8,282 
Agip Italy 4 101,660 
YPF Argentina 4 19,615 
Texaco United States 3 26,188 
Esso United States 2 13,242 
Shell Netherlands 1 1,537 
Bristish Petroleum United Kingdom 1 2,306 
British Borneo United Kingdom 1 961 
Amerada Hess United States 1 4,812 
Kerr McGee United States 1 3,208 
Unocal United States 1 7,569 
Total 189,377 
Source: ANP. 
In the case of oil refining, importing and exporting of oil, 
oil by-products and natural gas, entry is taking place through the 
granting of authorisations by the regulator, in the expectation 
that this will help to increase competition in these activities. 
Finally, for the sale of oil by-products and LPG, entry had already 
been deregulated, while the regulation of entry to the distribution 
of natural gas is the responsibility of individual state governments, 
and it takes place through the granting of concessions. 
3.2. Regulation of Competition 
Aneel and ANP use very different instruments to promote 
competition and restrain actions that constitute an abuse of 
market power, since in the electrical sector the aim is to achieve 
the functioning of a competitive market, while in the oil sector, 
competition is at the margin of Petrobras' operations, with the 
assumption, therefore, of a highly asymmetric market. At the 
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same time, there is a lack of effective mechanisms for the inter-
action and co-ordination of regulatory efforts in both the electrical 
and oil sectors with regard to pricing policies, and even the 
regulation of access to electricity transmission lines and gas 
pipelines. This point is particularly important, in view of the need 
to expand the share of natural gas as a percentage of total energy 
consumption, as well as of total raw materiais for electricity 
generation. 
Within the electrical sector, regulation of competition has 
the aim of promoting, in a complementary way, the encourage-
ment of competition in the generation and commercial segments, 
prevention of market concentration, and ultimately, respect for 
the special characteristics of the Brazilian hydrological system. 
This particular characteristic of the sector is by no means unim-
portant, and as will be observed later, there is no answer to the 
question as to how the apparently irreconcilable aims of "compe-
tition and co-ordination" will coexist. 
On the one hand, the new legislation has created technical 
forms of regulating competition, aimed at harmonising the open-
ing of the market with optimal dispatch within the interconnected 
system. In this way, the free negotiation of energy in the wholesale 
electricity market will be subordinated to operational planning, 
programming and dispatch by the National Operator of the Elec-
trical System (ONS), which will also be responsible for managing 
ali transmission assets held by generation and distribution com-
panies. 16 
On the other hand, sector legislation aims to promote 
competition by deverticalizing the generation, transmission, dis-
tribution and commercial segments. With Law 9,648 of 1998, 
companies will be obliged to establish subsidiaries or separate 
accounting for these different areas of activity. 17 In addition, the 
regulations stipulate the obligatory provision of free access to the 
transmission network for any agent within the Brazilian electrical 
system, in addition to large industrial consumers, providing an 
opportunity for new ways of selling electricity within the MAE. 18 
In order to restrain activities that lead to market concen-
tration, the new legislation of the electrical sector through Aneel 
16 The ONS is a corporate body that operates under private law, and is composed of representatives of 
the various agents within the sector, large consumers and the government, in the form of a 
private-sector association. The ONS began operating on March 1, 1999, and since then has 
progressively absorbed functions formerly attributed to the Coordinating Group for the Operation 
of the Interconnected System (GCOI), that was coordinated by the state-owned company, Eletrobrás. 
17 The deverticalization of the integrated companies was adopted with the aim of making non-discrimi-
natory billing possible within the distribution network, allowing consumers to see specific costs, and 
expanding the non-captive market. All distributors are obliged to grant passage to blocks of energy 
traded by agents of the MAE, charging the commissions due for the use of their lines (basic network 
with voltages of 69 kV or more). 
18 The safe of blocks of energy through the MAE may be on a short-term (spot) or long-terra basis, and 
will take place through the negotiation of financial contracts called Wholesale Electricity Market 
Contracts. 
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Resolution 94 of 1998 has established a series of limits on 
stockholding composition on cross-holdings and policies for the 
purchase and sale of electricity between agents. 19 
In addition to the complexity of making the incentives for 
entry compatible with technical regulation, from the point of view 
of competition, the adequate functioning of the new regulatory 
model for the electrical sector depends on the conclusion of the 
process of separation and subsequent privatisation of federal 
companies, as determined by Law 9,648 of 1998. 20 At the same 
time, considering the interest groups involved, the government 
has faced severe political difficulties in promoting this process, 
such as the solution of the settlement of employee liabilities and 
the separation of nuclear assets in the case of Furnas, the 
definition of water regulation in the case of Chesf, and the 
economic and financial feasibility of the isolated systems in the 
case of Eletronorte. 
In the oil and gas sectors, with the exception of restrictions 
that oblige Petrobras to constitute specific subsidiaries in each of 
its areas of operation within the sectors, regulation of competition 
has not yet been subject to specific rules, with only the general 
guideline mentioned above, that the ANP must communicate any 
fact to the Cade that constitutes an infraction of economic nature. 
The entry of new agents into ali segments of these industries 
following the relaxation of Petrobras' monopoly, requires the rapid 
adoption of rules that discipline cross-holdings and free access 
to transport segments, most notably in the case of natural gas. 
In this case, the presence of a single group of investors in the 
exploration, transport and distribution segments could result in 
the concentration of this market, with the consequent risk of 
abuse by the dominant power, and the occurrence of practices 
that discriminate against other agents. 21 We should also mention 
the importance of co-ordination between the ANP and the regu-
latory agencies at the individual state levei, with regard to actions 
19 According to this resolution, it is prohibited for market agents: a) to hold more than 20% of the 
national installed capacity, or 25% and 35% of the existing capacity of the South/Southeast/Cen-
tre-West and the North/Northeast interconnected systems, respectively; b) to hold more than 20% 
of the national distribution market, or 25% and 35% of the distribution market of the South/South-
east/Centre-West and the North/Northeast interconnected systems, respectively: and c) to own 
cross-holdings in generation and distribution companies arnounting to more than 30%, taking the 
arithmetic sum of the shares in the two markets. In addition, a distribution company may only 
acquire energy produced by itself up to the limit of 30% of its demand. 
20 The original ideais to reduce the market power of the existing generators with the creation, primarily, 
of the following companies: three from Furnas (two generators and one transmission company), four 
from Chesf (three generators and one transmission company) and six from Eletronorte (two isolated 
generators, one generator that supplies the interconnected system, including the Tucuruí hydro-
electric plant, one transmission company for the interconnected system, and two integrated 
companies that supply the isolated systems). 
21 While the participation of the private sector is a recent phenomenon in the natural gas sector, it is 
already possible to verify trends towards vertical integration and market concentration. British Gas 
and Shell, for example, which are joint owners of the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline, are stockholders of 
Comgãs, the largest distributor of natural gas in the country. In the same way, other stockholders 
in the pipeline, Enron and Petrobras, already hold equity stakes in several natural gas distributors 
in the states of the Northeast. 
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that prevent market concentration. These measures may be taken 
to discipline the acquisition of assets by natural gas distributors 
that are involved in decentralised privatisation programs by 
individual states. 
3.3. Definition of Tariffs 
The definition of tariffs in the downstream segments of the 
electrical and natural gas sectors is one of the most sensitive 
aspects of the restructuring and privatisation processes within 
the Brazilian energy sector. It is in this area that the fragility of 
the regulatory models is most accentuated, because they did not 
follow the optimal sequence of regulatory reforms, which should 
be the strengthening of the new regulatory agencies before priva-
tisation. 22 In the electrical sector, as mentioned above, the begin-
ning of privatisation process preceded even the creation of Aneel, 
with the first three concession contracts signed by the former 
Dnaee, an agency subordinated to the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy. 23 
For the sectors that have remained natural monopolies, 
distribution and transmission tariffs are being regulated accord-
ing to the criteria of price cap and revenue cap, respectively. 24 
 With regard to transmission tariffs, new investments in transmis-
sion lines will be remunerated on the basis of benchmark prices 
for the use of the basic network, that is, lines with voltages of 230 
kV or more, as well as connection costs, taking finto account the 
characteristics of the geoelectric zones where generators and 
consumers are connected. 25 The defmition of tariffs for the tran-
sport segment entailed a major dispute within the sector, particu-
larly with regard to the definition of the "basic network" subject 
to management by the ONS, since the classification of assets 
potentially affected the sharing of revenues between transmission 
and distribution companies. 
The amounts of the initial tariffs for electricity distribution 
to captive clients are being defined in the new concession con-
tracts. The need, on the one hand, to start privatising in the face 
22 This optimal sequence is suggested in Pinheiro (1999, p. 171), but has not been observed in the 
restructuring of any infrastructure sector in Latin America, where the last stage of the sequence 
preceded the first two for reasons of fiscal nature. 
23 Escelsa was privatized only four months after the approval of the Concessions Law, and is the only 
contract that does not introduce a price cap regime. 
24 The price cap regime adopted internationally consists of the establishment by the regulator of a price 
ceiling either for the average price or for each product of the company, corrected according to the 
change in the consumer price index, less a percentage corresponding to a productivity factor for a 
predetermined number of years. For a revenue cap, the initial permitted revenue is adjusted by the 
change in inflation less an efficiency factor, in order to encourage productivity gains. 
25 On the one hand, this measure aims to give greater transparency to electricity transport tariffs in 
order to avoid discriminatory billing: i.e. the charging of differentiated tariffs to different agents for 
transport via the same network. This measure aims to ensure that the operation of the grid is neutral 
with regard to anti-competitive practices among network owners. On the other hand, it is hoped that 
the revenues allowed to the operators will be sufficient to reward their investment. 
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of inertia arising from strong opposition to the transfer of electri-
cal assets and, on the other, the urgent requirement for funds to 
reduce the public-sector deficit, led the government to choose this 
course. In attempting to attract the private sector given this lack 
of regulatory definition, a "vicious circle" was created, in which 
there would only be an incentive to entry if contracts reduced the 
regulatory risks to the investor as much as possible, which would 
in turn entail that the checks and balances between the various 
parties would be unfavourable for the consumer. 26 
In the oil and gas sector, Law 9,478 of 1997 established a 
limit of three years (until August 2000) for the deregulation of 
prices of ali basic oil and natural gas by-products charged by 
refineries and processing units. In a clear move to reduce the 
autonomy of the ANP during this transition period, the Finance 
Ministry and the Mining and Energy Ministry are continuing to 
set adjustments and revisions to the prices of these products on 
a joint basis. Tariff policy is one of the Gordian knots of the reform 
of the Brazilian oil sector, and historically, the price structure of 
fuels has been used as an "umbrella" to meet widely varying 
interests of social groups and areas of the government. 27 It may 
be said that there are so many interests at stake, that the 
privatisation of Petrobras is unlike to take place in the medium 
term. 
Generally, natural gas supply prices are set by state 
governments, which as mentioned above, have stockholding con-
trol of most of the concessionaires, often in partnership with the 
private sector. This can nevertheless lead to the setting of prices 
on the basis of political factors, in addition to their eventual 
subordination to the interests of the private partners. It should 
also be mentioned that in the recent privatisation of three com-
panies, CEG (Rio de Janeiro), Riogás (Rio de Janeiro) and Comgás 
(São Paulo), the concessionaires were obliged to adopt predeter-
mined price ceilings. 
3.4. Monitoring of Concession Contracts 
Within the electrical sector, concession contracts are not 
standardised, even if there are general procedures established by 
various state governments in harmony with Aneel. These con-
tracts also include fines and penalties for failure to meet stan-
dards of service. This is another case of Aneel suffering as a result 
of its difficulty in affirming itself within the new institutional 
model. In addition to the poor state of repair of the distribution 
lines due to the lack of investment while the system was managed 
26 Examples of this are the fact that the contracts for Light and Cerj provided respectively for a first 
tariff revision after eight and seven years, as well as the fact that all concession contracts signed by 
the 16 privatized distributors (62% of the domestic market) stipulated a tariff reduction factor of 
zero. 
27 For an analysis of tariff policy in the fuel and oil sectors within Brazil, see Dutra and Cecchi (1999). 
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by the public sector, concessionaires implemented indiscriminate 
outsourcing and redundancy policies in an attempt to reap 
extraordinary profits within a tariff regime that provided incen-
tives for gains in the efficiency of production. This led to blackouts 
and a deterioration in technical and management quality 
[Abranches (1999)). The agency responded in a dubious manner, 
initially making greater efforts to defend the privatisation process 
itself (as an agent of the government) did than consumers in 
general (as a regulatory agency). Aneel has subsequently tried to 
achieve social legitimacy by strengthening chameis of communi-
cation with consumer protection agencies, and attempting to 
develop more systematic mechanisms for monitoring service 
quality. 
In the oil and gas sectors, the emphasis within the ups-
tream segment is on investment plans and company operations. 
Contracts for exploration and oil production must establish 
lengths of concession, as well as plans and projects for the 
development of production. Concessionaires must undertake to 
conduct their activities in a transparent manner, as well as to 
adopt technical standards for rationalising production and con-
trolling the decline in their reserves. For oil refming and natural 
gas processing in general, the ANP has established technical 
requirements for modernisation and capacity expansion through 
authorisations that are intended to increase production and 
hence reduce the subsidies that such concessions currently 
receive. In such cases, the adoption of a complementary compe-
tition yardstick mechanism can make an important contribution 
to reducing the asymmetry of information enjoyed by the com-
pany, most notably by increasing the efficiency of regulation in 
promoting the modernisation of industrial plants. For the down-
stream segment of the industry, and in the specific case of oil 
by-products, the emphasis is on control of the quality of fuels. In 
the case of natural gas distribution, concession contracts signed 
by state governments that privatised their companies (Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo), establish norms for expanding service 
coverage, standards of quality for services provided, and the 
possibility of imposing fines and penalties on concessionaires that 
fail to meet the obligations laid down in their contracts. 
4. Outlook 
The reforms of the electricity, oil and natural gas sectors 
face different challenges in the pursuit of their respective objec-
tives. The structural difficulty of the model for the electricity 
sector is the conciliation of competition with co-ordination. As a 
result of the lack of definition of the rufes for transmission tariffs, 
subordination to the operational planning of the ONS and, espe-
cially, uncertainties as to the future levei of generation costs, has 
Ensaios BNDES n 2 11 
	 17 
led the private sector to lirnit its entry in the sector, with no 
concrete investment plans in new generation units. 
In view of the signal sent by the Ten-Year Development 
Plan 1999/2008, of the Co-ordination and Sectorial Planning 
Group (GCPS), concerning the risk of supply deficits between 
1999 and 2001 in excess of the limit considered acceptable (5%) 
for the Brazilian electricity system (see Table 3), the Mining and 
Energy Ministry, the Aneel and the BNDES have adopted a set of 
emergency measures to increase the electricity supply in the short 
term. 
Among the other important measures, Aneel expects to 
mitigate the risks of energy deficits and the negative effects of the 
aspects related to the expectations of new investors in response 
to the announcement of regulatory amounts of electricity genera-
tion. These will come to serve as a parameter for "new energy" 
transactions in the MAE and, among other things, will allow 
investors in the generation segment to better project their reve-
nue28 [MME (1999)]. 
With the objective of helping to successfully get through 
the critical energy supply periods in 1999/2001, the BNDES 
created the Program to Finance Priority Investments in the Elec-
tricity Investments, which is applicable to generation projects 
identified as a priority by the Mining and Energy Ministry. 29 
Table 3 
Risks of Electricity Deficits in the Brazilian Electricity 
System - 1999/2008 
Year South Southeast/ 
Centre-West 
North Northeast 
1999 5.8 5.4 1.4 2.4 
2000 9.9 9.8 4.7 5.1 
2001 4.0 6.4 4.0 4.7 
2002 2.1 3.0 3.0 2.9 
2003 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.0 
2004 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.0 
2005 1.2 1.8 2.3 2.6 
2006 0.7 1.5 2.1 3.2 
2007 0.8 1.1 2.1 2.9 
2008 0.9 1.6 2.6 4.1 
Source: Ten-Year Development Plan 1999/2008 - GCPS [see BNDES (1999)1. 
Note: Numbers in bold show years in which there is a risk of a deficit greater than 5%. 
28 Among the additional measures that are being analyzed by Aneel, the most important are the changes 
to clauses of Resolution 233 of 1999 so as to introduce flexibility to the percentage weightings of the 
regulatory amounts for gas-fired thermal electric generation (with a view to absorbing variations in 
the currency and in fuel prices) and the automatic transfer of variations in generation costs to supply 
tariffs [MME (1999)1. 
29 The priority projects total 23 thermal electric plants that will add 7.5 GW to the installed capacity 
by 2003. For a detailed list of the priority projects and the financial conditions of this specific BNDES 
program, see BNDES (1999). 
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Complementarily, the Mining and Energy Ministry has 
authorised Eletrobrás to operate as an energy seller, entering into 
advance purchase contracts of energy with investors in thermal 
generation - called Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) - so as to 
reduce existing uncertainties regarding the return of new private-
sector projects in gas- or oil-fired thermal electric plants. This 
also will have the effect of making fmancing for the construction 
of these projects easier to obtain. In addition, the average price of 
natural gas used in thermal electric generation fell to US$ 2.26/ 
MMBTU, with a view to making the price of this input more 
compatible with the regulatory amounts established by Aneel. 
This set of measures shows a change in the path adopted 
for the electricity sector. In the previous situation, the government 
bet on full privatisation accompanied by a gradual opening to 
competition (beginning in 2003, 25% of the total of initial con-
tracts and 100% of all new generation will be freely bought and 
sold on the MAE). Without interrupting its privatisation strategy 
- in spite of serious problems with implementation - the govern-
ment opted to retreat from its strategy of opening the market. 
It is important to note that one of the bets was on the end 
of centralised planning, which would take on the role of serving 
as a guideline, but the government and also assumed a strategy 
of "heavy intervention" in the short term, expecting with this set 
of measures to successfully navigate the period of critical supply 
in the electricity sector (until 2001). As a result, in the short term 
the competition on the spot market would be marginal, since with 
the solutions adopted the contracts would already include the 
established prices. Large consumers would inevitably pressure 
for better supply conditions, although the trend would be to 
negotiate long-term bilateral contracts to reduce the risks caused 
by price volatility. The big surprise was the Russian crisis, its 
impacts on the expectations of economic agents and the sub-
sequent effect on the exchange rate, which negatively impacted 
natural gas imports and the possibility of new generation inves-
tments that utilised this input. 
The objective in the oil sector is to attract the private sector, 
especially in exploration and production, in view of the significant 
attractiveness of the project portfolio in the areas not explored by 
Petrobras due to the state-owned company's restrictions on in-
creasing investments. The sector's major problem is the definition 
of price structures, its impacts on the entire production chain and 
its repercussions on the electricity sector, in which Petrobras is 
expected to operate as a non-utility producer with the construc-
tion of some 400 MW of gas-fired thermal electric plants. 
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5. Final Considerations 
The reforms of the energy sector in Brazil introduced 
independent regulatory agencies (Aneel and ANP) that represent 
an important innovation in the organisation of the State. For a 
country with Brazil's political tradition, these autonomous state-
owned companies can help in overcoming the problems of imple-
menting mies for the sector, bringing gains for the Brazilian 
people with greater transparency in the carrying out of the 
regulatory agenda. 
However, Aneel and ANP will encounter a series of difficul-
ries and challenges before they may effectively become indepen-
dent agencies, in view of the timing of their creation in relation to 
the beginning of the reform and/or privatisation processes. In the 
electricity sector, the government's bet was on full privatisation 
together with the gradual introduction of competition. The ab-
sence of adequate tules for stimulating the entry of the private 
sector led the expected investments to not materialise at the 
necessary rate and the government was forced to adopt a series 
of mechanisms to remove the risks of energy deficits from the 
system. Even though the regulatory apparatus for defending 
competition is well defined, the emphasis on technical regulation 
and the need to attract investors places two huge challenges on 
the path to Aneel's consolidation. The first challenge is to be able 
to signal that they are moving towards a more competitive envi-
ronment (which also includes smaller consumers) and the second 
is to allow captive consumers to benefit from the gains in produc-
tion efficiency obtained by the companies. 
From the ANP's point of view, its activities are also subject 
to significant challenges. First, since the emphasis of the reforms 
in the oil sector was neither privatisation nor the introduction of 
significant competition, the necessary attention was not given to 
mechanisms to defend competition. In view of the success in 
attracting private-sector capital for upstream investments and 
investments in the strengthening of Petrobras itself to be able to 
form partnerships in the domestic and international market, the 
oil and gas sectors' interface with the electricity sector makes, it 
necessary the speedy definition of controls on market share and 
the regulation of free access to gas and oil pipelines. Otherwise, 
there is a risk of consolidating some positions and creating 
irreversible damage that will be difficult to overcome, especially 
because of the size of the new players in the industry. Secondly, 
it is essential that the ANP attains autonomy for setting tariff 
policies and that the agency's regulations be improved, especially 
in terms of stability. 
In summary, the consolidation of the modernisation of the 
Brazilian State, in particular the strengthening of its role as 
regulator, is directly related to the success of the sector-specific 
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reforms in progress. The capacity of the agencies to efficiently 
exercise their respective regulatory agendas is crucial to their 
legitimacy and the society may identify with the need of deliberate 
construction of a competitive environment in the infrastructure 
sectors with no loss of the benefits accrued from co-ordination. 
This option shows that, on the one hand, one should not hope for 
the illusion of automatic benefits from competition, and, on the 
other hand, one should not become paralysed in view of the risk 
of losses in the co-ordination of the system. 
It is essential that consumer representation channels are 
strengthened, both in monitoring and demanding their rights 
from service providers, and in the oversight and social control of 
regulatory agencies to assure the faithful accomplishment of the 
regulatory agenda. Only a society truly informed and active in the 
practice of obtaining their rights as citizens will be prepared to 
push regulatory action in the direction of services that create 
positive externalities for economic development. 
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